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THE ROLE OF PUBLIC UTILITY
REGULATION: OVERSIGHT OR ONSITE?
Public utility regulation in the US, especially electric and
gas utility regulation, produces results that are often the
exact opposite from those intended many years ago when
Congress and the respective state legislatures perceived the
need for federal and state public utility commissions
(PUCs). While there was a great deal of variation among
the states, the first two decades of the twentieth century
saw legislation imposing state regulatory controls over
most electric, gas, and telephone companies. But the
authority vested in a PUC in a typical jurisdiction was only
to regulate the maximum rates of existing companies and
to restrict competition in order to avoid price wars and
what was viewed as competitive instability. Today,
regulation is far more extensive than originally intended,
and the cost of regulation to the US economy is perhaps in
the billions of dollars.
Over the years, especially since the Arab oil embargo in
the 1970s, PUCs have increased their control over utilities.
As a result, multi-million dollar, even billion dollar,
decisions that should be made by utility executives are
being made, directly or indirectly, by PUCs. As legislatures
and PUCs subject more utility functions to regulatory
approval (for example, capital structures, construction
budgets, plant type, fuel procurement, financing
arrangements, advertising, forecasting), a utility’s output
becomes the product of some regulator’s “notion.” That
regulator is often without the training or experience to
make an informed decision, or he or she has incomplete
information on which to base his or her actions. Worse yet,
the regulator often attempts to be equitable by requiring
something from everyone, for example, approving
recovery of the cancellation cost of a power plant, but
having the stockholder and ratepayer share the costs. In the
real world, however, the ratepayer pays the entire cost.
Stockholders simply sell their shares if they disapprove of
the regulators’ decision, and that action may actually
increase the cost of capital to the ratepayers.
Regardless of the regulators’ particular “notions,” we
never find out if they were right or wrong. Even if it were
less costly for the ratepayer to pay for a plant cancellation
at today’s capital costs rather than at tomorrow’s, no
regulator will be held accountable. We don’t have ex poste
“what if ” scenarios to judge the judges. Few, if any,
decisions of regulators are judged to see if they in fact
benefited the public as intended.
Since most major utility decisions need various federal
and/or state regulatory approvals, the regulator, implicitly
or explicitly, makes the decisions that management should
be making – indeed is paid to make. The problem is
exacerbated by ever- increasing regulation. For example,
take a perceived societal problem like high utility rates.
Legislators and regulators try to fix the problem by
increasing regulatory oversight. The problem just gets
worse, and the legislators and regulators come to the
rescue with . . . even more regulatory oversight. This is like
trying to douse a fire with kerosene. As former Secretary
of Treasury, William Simon, writing in The Wall Street
Journal some years ago, aptly said: “the more the
government tinkers with the markets, the worse things
get.”
Even more dramatic than the shift from private to public
utility management decision-making, through legislative
“tinkering,” is the revelation that utility regulation does not
lower prices; instead it causes them to rise. Textbooks are
replete with the assumption that regulation pushes prices
down and pushes quantity out. Regulation was intended to
prevent the monopolist from maximizing profits by
lowering prices, which would result in increased output.
But regulation has not performed that function for years.
Today, regulating major public utilities means “pulling
prices up.” Public utility regulation, once envisioned by
economic purists as “oversight” of monopolies, today, for
all practical purposes, is “onsite” command and control.
Fortunately, a few state legislatures and PUCs, like
Virginia’s, have made a noble attempt to ensure that
regulation is “oversight” – not “onsite.” In those states, we
have seen instances of deregulation (or streamlined
regulation) of electric, gas, and telephone utilities, cable
television, cellular telephone companies, paging, and other
telecommunication companies. The resulting competition
has produced quantum leaps in options for customers,
particularly in the telecommunications industry. The
consumer will benefit accordingly, assuming the proper
balance in regulation. To paraphrase economist Milton
Friedman: “[m]any people want the [regulator] to protect
the consumer. A much more urgent problem is to protect
the consumer from the [regulator].”
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